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Abstract 
  Imperfectly credible trade liberalization can lead to balance of payment 
deterioration and a subsequent reversal of the reform. Therefore, this paper 
examines whether the likelihood of policy reversal depends on the rate of tariff 
reduction or the degree of labor mobility. The analysis shows that transitory 
unemployment increases the likelihood of policy reversal. Furthermore, a gradual 
reduction in the tariff rate is found to extend the life of the liberalization episode, 
but does not necessarily increase the likelihood of sustained liberalization. 
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Policies that lack credibility can have unintended and harmful 
consequences. Thus, the issue of credibility has been given consideration 
throughout the literature. With regards to trade liberalization though, studies on 
the impact of imperfect credibility fall into two categories.  In the first category, 
papers emphasize that imperfectly credible trade liberalization distorts 
intertemporal choice. In Calvo (1987), (1988), and (1989), consumers reduce 
savings through capital inflows in response to an expected reversal of the trade 
liberalization. Likewise, in Rodrik (1989b), the expectation of a policy reversal 
prompts consumers to reduce savings, which, given a closed capital account, 
produces a higher interest rate and lower investment. Papers in the second 
category find that imperfect credibility increases the current account deficit and 
can cause the trade liberalization to be aborted. In both Froot (1988) and Buffie 
(1995), expectations of future tariffs induce an import binge by consumers.  If the 
import binges reduce foreign exchange reserves to some critical level, the 
government is forced to reverse the trade liberalization. 
Given the consequences of imperfectly credible trade liberalization, two 
questions arise. First, under what conditions are these trade liberalizations likely 
to be reversed? Second, can the liberalization policy be designed in such a way so 
as to reduce the risk of policy reversal? Addressing the first question, Buffie 
(1995) finds that the sustainability of imperfectly credible trade liberalization 
depends on the size of the government’s foreign exchange reserve cushion and on 
the size of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution relative to the real income gains from liberalization. However, Buffie (1995) assumes full employment 
holds throughout the liberalization episode. This may be a strong assumption 
since imperfect credibility can undermine trade liberalization through the labor 
market. More specifically, when trade liberalization lacks credibility, not only 
would consumers binge on imports, but also labor released from the import-
competing sector might not choose to seek employment in the export sector. As a 
result, the decrease in production in the import-competing sector would not be 
completely offset by increased production in the export sector. Thus, as Rodrik 
(1989a) contends, efficiency gains from liberalization may not be realized under 
imperfect credibility. 
Even if a country’s economic characteristics are not conducive to 
sustained trade liberalization, liberalization policies can potentially be designed 
to reduce the risk of policy reversal. Indeed, economists have speculated about 
the appropriate design of trade liberalization policy. Most notably, economists 
such as Dornbusch (1992) and Takacs (1990) have asserted that gradual trade 
liberalization can reduce balance of payments problems, which would increase 
the likelihood of sustained liberalization. 
Research on the impact of gradual trade liberalization is not 
unprecedented.  Rodrik (1989b) focuses on the political economy aspects of trade 
liberalization and finds that the speed of liberalization signals government 
commitment to maintaining the liberalization. Other papers, including Mussa 
(1986), Albuquerque and Rebelo (1998), and Mehlum (1998), determine that 
gradualism can reduce income distribution shifts or unemployment that would 
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(1986) demonstrate that gradual tariff reduction produces higher welfare than 
instantaneous liberalization when external financing constraints fall 
disproportionately on investment, which is typical of developing countries. 
Nonetheless, research on the impact of gradualism on the balance of 
payments is virtually absent from the body of literature on trade liberalization, 
despite the conventional wisdom that gradualism can reduce balance of payments 
problems. In fact, only Froot (1988) formally demonstrates a link between the 
rate of tariff reduction and the balance of payments. More specifically, Froot 
(1988) finds that not only does gradualism produce a lower current account 
deficit than does instantaneous trade liberalization, but it also increases the 
likelihood that the liberalization will be sustained. 
With a different structure though, I will attempt to make the relationship 
between gradualism, the balance of payments, and the sustainability of the reform 
more transparent and more indicative of a developing economy than in Froot 
(1988). Accordingly, the following infinite-horizon analysis differs from Froot’s 
two-period model in that it is deterministic, has money as an asset, and allows for 
large tariffs and income effects. First, the deterministic approach makes clear the 
connection between the imperfectly credible policy and the current account 
deficit because the current account deficit is not hit by random shocks as it is in 
Froot’s model. Second, with money as an asset, the relationship between the 
private sector’s behavior following trade liberalization and the resulting current 
account deficits can be viewed simply and transparently. Third, by allowing for 
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countries can be more accurately understood since pre-liberalization tariffs in 
these countries are often greater than 50 percent. 
Moreover, an infinite-horizon framework is better equipped to analyze the 
dynamics of gradualism. In Froot's two-period model, consumers binge on 
imports when they expect reversal of the trade liberalization. Gradualism is 
introduced into the model in the form of a small first-period tariff in order to 
counter the impact of the speculative import purchases. More specifically, the 
first-period tariff would prompt consumers to spend less than they would if there 
were no first-period tariff, reducing the pressure on the current account. From 
such a model, one concludes that gradualism decreases the likelihood of a 
balance of payments crisis and, thus, increases the likelihood of sustained 
liberalization. In an infinite-horizon model, however, a time will come under 
gradual liberalization where the representative agent faces virtually the same 
tariff rate and, thus, the same incentives to binge on import goods as under 
instantaneous liberalization. Thus, in an infinite-horizon framework, gradualism 
extends the duration of the liberalization episode, but may not increase the 
likelihood of sustained liberalization. Consequently, the impact of gradualism is 
not as obvious as the two-period model would lead one to believe. Taken 
together, the differences in this paper’s model from Froot’s allow for more 
quantitative results and better understanding of the impact of gradualism on the 
likelihood of sustained trade liberalization. 
  4Fundamentally, this paper builds on the model developed in Buffie (1995) 
by extending it in two important ways – by allowing for gradual liberalization 
and for transitory unemployment. Two reasons drive the choice to include 
transitory unemployment. First, as noted in Harrison and Hanson (1999), 
economists know very little about the short-run impact of trade liberalization on 
unemployment. Even less is known about the short-run impact of imperfectly 
credible trade liberalization on unemployment. Thus, the possibility of transitory 
unemployment being a byproduct of trade liberalization should not be 
disregarded in an analysis on the sustainability of imperfectly credible trade 
liberalization. Second, research is also lacking on the impact of transitory 
unemployment on the sustainability of trade liberalization. The World Bank study 
by Papageorgiou, Michaely, and Choksi (1991) is a notable exception. However, 
the study excludes trade liberalizations that are reversed in less than two years. 
Thus, their data is likely to be biased against transitory unemployment affecting 
the sustainability of the trade liberalization, particularly in light of section 7 in 
this paper, which demonstrates that trade liberalizations incurring transitory 
unemployment will likely be reversed in less than a year. 
In summary, this paper will extend the literature by examining how the 
degree of labor mobility following imperfectly credible trade liberalization 
impacts the sustainability of the liberalization. Furthermore, with the 
sustainability of the trade liberalization at stake, appropriate design of the 
liberalization policy becomes an issue. Thus, this paper will also examine 
whether the rate of tariff reduction impacts the liberalization’s sustainability. 
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reduces the pressure on the current account deficit and increases the likelihood 
that the trade reform will be sustained when the public believes it will be 
reversed. 
The need for such research is best illustrated by the experiences of 
countries that have tried to liberalize trade. According to several studies, at least 
fifty percent of trade liberalizations are reversed.
1 Often these reversals follow 
balance of payments crises. As noted in Papageorgiou, Michaely, and Choksi 
(1991: 141), "episodes of liberalization in which foreign exchange reserves keep 
rising, or at least do not fall, are most likely to be fully sustainable, whereas 
policy reversal is almost bound to follow a falling trend of reserves." Moreover, 
the liberalization attempts that do result in balance of payments crises are often 
believed to lack credibility. If the private sector expects the liberalization to be 
reversed, they will stock up on imports while the tariff is low, which in turn 
reduces the central bank's foreign exchange reserves. The experiences of many 
developing countries, ranging from Kenya (1978 and 1980) to Mexico (1988), 
support the link between imperfectly credible trade policy and depletion of 
foreign exchange reserves.
2 Therefore, if research can show that gradually 
reducing the tariff rate decreases balance of payments pressure and thus increases 
the likelihood that imperfectly credible trade reform is sustained, then perhaps 
future liberalization attempts will not succumb to the same fate as previous 
attempts. 
  6The paper is organized into eleven sections. After describing the model in 
section 2, the foreign exchange reserves losses under both perfectly and 
imperfectly credible liberalization are derived in sections 3 and 4. Then, the 
model is calibrated in section 5. The subsequent four sections provide analysis on 
the impact of transitory unemployment and the rate of tariff reduction on the 
sustainability of imperfectly credible trade liberalization. Transitory 
unemployment, resulting from the trade liberalization's lack of credibility, is 
shown to increase the likelihood of cumulative payments deficit and thus, 
decrease the likelihood of sustained liberalization. Furthermore, gradualism is 
shown to extend the duration of the liberalization episode when full employment 
is maintained and when the trade policy's lack of credibility leads to transitory 
unemployment. However, gradual tariff reduction appears to have no impact on 
the sustainability of trade liberalization for a standard infinite-horizon model. In 
section 10, the model is modified to include foreign bonds as an asset in order to 
examine the impact of transitory unemployment and the speed of liberalization 
under an open capital account. Unfortunately, transitory unemployment is found 
to decrease the likelihood of sustained liberalization here as well. Under certain 
circumstances though, gradualism is found to increase the likelihood of sustained 
liberalization. Section 11 concludes. 
 
2.  The model 
To examine how the rate of tariff reduction and the degree of labor 
mobility affect the sustainability of the trade reform, I develop a competitive, 
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account and one financial asset, money. In this model, a representative agent 
produces and consumes an export good and an import good. The export good is 
not taxed. Thus for simplicity, the price of the export good will be suppressed in 
the functions below. However, the import good is subject to a tariff h. Therefore, 
the domestic price for the import good is 1 , m Ph = +  given that world prices are 
set to unity. 
 
2.1.  Production and employment 
Domestic output is produced according to  ( ) , ss QF L K ≡ , s  where Ls and 
Ks are the labor employment and capital stock in sector s, respectively. Ks is 
assumed to be constant since the model is examining adjustment problems in the 
short and medium runs. Assuming perfect competition and cost minimization, the 
sectoral labor demands are 
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where σs is the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital in sector s, 
s
j θ  
is the cost share of resource j in the production of good s, and a circumflex 
denotes the percentage change in a variable. 
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the lack of credibility does not affect labor decisions, wages will adjust to 
maintain full employment. Consequently, 
   (1)  ˆˆ , m LP =Γ m
where 















() , mm m m PQ R P L α ≡  denotes the production share of the import-competing 
good, and R(⋅) is the economy's revenue or GDP function. 
Alternatively, if labor released from the import-competing sector expects 
a policy reversal that would return her to that sector in the near future, she may 
choose to remain unemployed rather than seek employment in the export sector, 
particularly when adjustment costs are high. If labor does not reallocate to the 
export sector because of the expectation of policy reversal, wages do not fall. 
Thus, to model the case where transitory unemployment arises as a result of 
imperfectly credible policy, wages are assumed to be inflexible in the downward 
direction. In such a case, the change in employment in the import-competing 
sector would be represented by  








=  (2) 
Thus, equations (1) and (2) characterize the polar cases where imperfectly 
credible liberalization results in either complete or no reallocation of the labor 
released from the import-competing sector to the export sector. 
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2.2.  The representative agent’s optimization problem 
The infinitely lived representative agent receives utility from consumption 
of the import good and the export good and from non-pecuniary services yielded 
by real money balances,  / m , M P
γ  where γ is the consumption share of the 
importable good.  Thus, the agent's problem is to choose nominal expenditures, 
E, and savings, S, to maximize 




mm VPE MP e d t
γρ φ
∞
− ⎡ + ⎣ ∫ , ⎤ ⎦
subject to 
  ( ) ( ) ,, mm m m ESR P L h D P E Q += + − , ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦  (4) 
 , M S =   (5) 
where ρ is the fixed time preference rate. The indirect utility function, V(⋅), and 
φ (⋅) are both increasing and strictly concave. Equation (4) gives the budget 
constraint, where the derivatives of the revenue function, R(⋅), are R1 = Qm, R2 = 
wm in the unemployment case, and R2 = 0 in the full employment case. Also, 
equation (4) shows that tariff revenues,  ( ) , m hDPE Q − , m ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦  are rebated in lump 
sum to the public, where the import volume is the difference between the 
Marshallian demand function for the import good,  ( ) , m , D PE and the domestic 
production of the import good, Qm. Furthermore, equation (5) states that the 
accumulation of nominal money balances, M, is the only way to increase savings. 
Therefore, the representative agent’s optimization problem is essentially the same 
  10as the one in Buffie (1995) except that here the revenue function allows for 
unemployment. 
 
2.3.  Gradual liberalization 
At time t = 0, the government implements a trade reform policy in which 
the tariff h will be reduced to a target level h* according to the policy rule 
  ( ) *, 0 hk h h k , = −>   (6) 
where k is a parameter and an overdot denotes a time derivate. Under a strict 
interpretation of equation (6), the target tariff level will not be reached in finite 
time when the tariff rate is reduced gradually. However, the parameter k can be 
chosen such that the tariff rate is arbitrarily close to the target level in a specified 
number of years after the liberalization is initiated. 
 
2.4.  The transition path 
The solution to the private agent's optimization problem provides the 
following first order conditions: 
  ( ) , Em VP E π = ,  (7) 
  ( ) ( ) ,/ Em m m VP E M P P ,
γ γ πρ φ ′ =−   (8) 
where  π is the multiplier associated with (4). Substituting (8) into the time 
derivative of (7) gives 
  ( ) ( ) ,/ EE EP E m m m VEVh V PE MP P .
γ γ ρφ ′ += −    (9) 
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toward this end, totally differentiate the budget constraint and substitute for Lm 
from equations (1) and (2). This yields 
  ( )
1 1, i dE D b dh g dS i
− =− − = 1 , 2 ,  (10) 
where 
() ( ) 1 1/ 1
m
L bh Z D h c εθ ⎡⎤ ≡+ Γ − + ⎣⎦ , x  (full  employment) 
() ( ) 2 1/ 1
mm
mL K x bh Z D h c εσ θ θ ⎡ ≡− − + ⎣ , ⎤ ⎦
)
 (transitory  unemployment) 
() ( 11 x gh c h ≡+ +,  
and b1, b2 represent the cases where imperfectly credible trade liberalization is 
followed by full employment and transitory unemployment, respectively. Also, ε 
is the compensated price elasticity of demand for the importable good, while cx 
denotes the marginal propensity to consume the export good. Since ordinary 
derivatives become time derivatives along the transition path, the derivatives in 
(10) can be converted to time derivatives and substituted with the policy rule into 
(9) to produce 
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−= − − − − + . ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦
  (11) 
Linearization of (5) and (11) around the new steady state where S = 0, M 
= M*, and h = h*, along with the policy rule, gives the economy’s dynamics. To 
better understand these dynamics, utilize both the formula for the income 
elasticity of money demand, δ, given by the steady state 
relationship () ( ) , mE m m PV P E M P /
γ γ ρφ ′ =  and Roy’s identity,  / PE . D VV = −  Under 
  12homothetic preferences, differentiation of Roy’s Identity with respect to E 
implies  1/ PE EE VV D , τ =+  where  / EE E VVE , τ ≡ −  the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution. Given these results, the economy's dynamics can be written as 
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3.  Perfectly credible liberalization 
Given that across steady states, savings is zero and labor is fully 
employed, equation (10) provides the real income gain resulting from perfectly 
credible trade liberalization: 
   (13)  1 ˆˆ ˆ . m EP b P γ −= −
Since b1 is positive, then the real income gain from trade liberalization is also 
positive. 
Setting the income elasticity of money demand to the accepted value of 
unity, equation (13) and the total derivative of the steady state condition, 
() ( ) ,/ Em m m VP E M P P ,
γ γ ρφ ′ =  yield the long run change in money balances: 
  ( ) 1 ˆˆ /1 m 1 , f MP b γ ≡= −  (14) 
where f1 denotes long-run elasticity of reserves with respect to Pm, under the 
simplifying assumption that the money supply equals the amount of foreign 
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payments surplus. 
As equation (14) demonstrates, a tariff reduction affects the cumulative 
balance of payments in two important ways, namely by changing the price level 
and real income. First, a tariff reduction lowers the price level, which in turn, 
lowers the demand for nominal money balances. Second, the real income gain 
associated with the trade liberalization raises the demand for real money 
balances. 
The impact on the cumulative balance of payments of reducing the price 
level will likely dominate the opposing real income effect. Thus, tariff reduction 
that is perceived by the public as being credible will likely lead to a cumulative 
payments deficit. For example, the long-run elasticity of reserves with respect to 
Pm is approximately 0.21 when parameters take the following values: h = 0.45, γ 
= 0.25, σm = σx = 1, ε = α = Z / D = 0.2, 
m
L θ  = 0.30, and 
x
L θ  = 0.45.
3,4
The results for the long run here are the same as those found in Buffie 
(1995). Not surprisingly, gradual tariff reduction does not affect the level of 
foreign exchange reserves needed to sustain a perfectly credible trade 
liberalization. In the following sections, I will examine whether or not this result 
also holds when trade liberalization lacks credibility. 
 
4.  Imperfectly credible liberalization 
If the tariff reduction is perceived by the private sector as being 
temporary, the economy may not converge to the long-run equilibrium associated 
  14with the lower tariff. Instead, the economy may follow a path consistent with the 
expectation that the trade reform will be reversed at some time t1. If this path 
leads to losses in foreign exchange reserves greater than what the government is 
willing or able to sustain, then the government would be forced to reverse the 
trade liberalization. In such a case, self-fulfilling failure (SFF hereafter) is an 
equilibrium. To determine if the economy can, in fact, converge to a SFF 
equilibrium, the transition path for an economy following temporary trade 
liberalization is analyzed.
5
With temporary liberalization, the economy follows a non-convergent 
path while the tariff is lower. More specifically, if the private sector expects the 
reform to be reversed at some time t1, S, M, and h evolve over the period (0, t1) 
according to 
   (15)  ()
3 12
11 22 3 3 1 ,
t tt St q e q e q e t t
λ λλ λλ λ =+ + Ω ≤ ,
1 , ,   ()
3 12
12 3 *
t tt M tM q e q e q e t t
λ λλ −= + + Ω ≤  (16) 
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t ht h q e t t
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Ω≡Δ − + ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦
 
q1, q2, and q3 are constants determined from the initial conditions, λ1, λ2, and λ3 
are eigenvalues, and M and h are predetermined variables. 
  15At time t1, the tariff immediately returns to its initial level. Thus, from t1 
onward, savings and nominal money balances follow a saddlepath back to the 
pre-liberalization equilibrium, namely 
  ( )
2
2 ,
t St y e t t
λ λ 1 , = ≥  (18) 




1 , M tM yet t
λ − =≥  (19) 
where y is a constant determined from the initial conditions, and M0 is the initial 
nominal money balances. 
From equations (15) through (19), the loss in foreign exchange reserves 
resulting from temporary liberalization can be ascertained. Toward this end, 
solutions for the constants q1, q2, q3, and y are derived in the appendix. With the 
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 (20) 
Because the government cannot sustain large losses in foreign exchange 
reserves, it will immediately return to the pre-liberalization tariff rate if total 
reserve losses are   where  , Ψ ( ) 00 ˆ . m M MM P Ψ≡ − ⎡ ⎣⎤ ⎦
6 Thus, at t , the time 
when the trade liberalization is reversed, 
1
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Ω+ − ⎧⎫ −− ⎡⎤ +− + − ⎨⎬ ⎣⎦ − ⎩⎭
1 , 2 . =
 (21) 
In addition,   is assumed to be at least as large as f Ψ 1, which guarantees that 
perfectly credible trade reform is sustainable. However, this condition is not 
sufficient to ensure that imperfectly credible reform is sustainable, though. 
Indeed, self-fulfilling failure is an equilibrium if (21) holds as an equality for 
some positive value of t1. 
The solution equation (21) differs from that in Buffie (1995) in that it 
allows for transitory unemployment and varying rates of tariff reduction. Thus, to 
see if these generalizations add insight on how best to liberalize trade in 
developing economies, it is worthwhile to examine the impact of each of them 
separately on equation (21) and then together. Toward this end, parameter values 
typical of developing economies are chosen in the next section. Then, the impact 
of transitory unemployment and gradualism are examined in sections 6, 7, 8, and 
9. 
 
5.  Model calibration 
In order to understand how gradualism and transitory unemployment 
impact the sustainability of imperfectly credible trade liberalizations, parameters 
in the model are specified in accordance with available real-world data, empirical 
  17evidence, and theory. In particular, the time preference rate, the income elasticity 
of money demand, and the ratio of money balances to national income are set at 
the accepted values of 0.05, 1, and 0.1, respectively. The values for the 
consumption share of the importable good ( ) 0.25 γ =  and the share of importable 
goods purchased from abroad ( ) 0.2 ZD =  reflect the import substitution 
structure of many developing economies prior to trade liberalization. With regard 
to the compensated elasticity of demand for the importable good, ε, a value of 0.2 
is chosen to be consistent with demand studies such as Blundell (1988) and 
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). A value of 2 is also chosen for ε to capture the 
impact of trade liberalization when large efficiency gains result. Furthermore, the 
literature does not provide clear guidance as to the exact values for the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, τ. Accordingly, τ will be allowed to vary 
from 0.1 to 2.
7
Concerning the production parameters, cross-sectional studies have found 
the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, σs, to be around unity, 
while time series studies have found it to be closer to 0.5.
8 Given the results of 
the cross-sectional studies, the elasticity of substitutions for both the import-
competing sector and the export sector are set at unity. Moreover, the cost share 
of labor in the import-competing sector,  ,
m
L θ  and the export sector,  ,
x
L θ  will be 
set at 0.3 and 0.45, respectively, as the import-competing sector in developing 
countries tends to be more capital intensive.
9 Finally, the production share of the 
import-competing good, α, is set at 0.2, given that manufacturing value added as 
  18a percent of GDP for low-income countries, excluding China and India, and for 
middle-income countries is 18% and 21%, respectively (World Bank, 2000: 253). 
The other factors that can impact the sustainability of the trade 
liberalization include the pre-liberalization tariff rate, the foreign reserve cushion, 
and the rate of tariff reduction. Based on a 1994 World Bank study by Dean, 
Desai, and Riedel, the pre-liberalization tariff rate, h, is set to 45%. Moreover,   
will be allowed to vary from f
Ψ
1 to 2, which means that the government's reserve 
cushion ranges from the amount needed to sustain perfectly credible trade 
liberalization to more than eight times the reserves needed to sustain perfectly 
credible liberalization. With regards to the rate of tariff reduction, k, the selected 
values are 0.46 and 2.3. A government that is eliminating tariffs at a 0.46 rate of 
tariff reduction will find that after five year of liberalization, the tariff rate is 10% 
of its original level. If the government chooses k = 2.3, though, the tariff rate will 
be 10% of its original level in one year after the trade liberalization is initiated. 
  Given these parameter values and equation (21), both qualitative and 
quantitative results of the impact of transitory unemployment and the rate of tariff 
reduction on the sustainability of imperfectly credible liberalization are derived in 
the following sections. 
 
6.  Instantaneous liberalization with full employment 
Before examining the impact of transitory unemployment and gradualism 
on the sustainability of imperfectly credible trade liberalization, it is worthwhile 
to know what factors affect the liberalization’s sustainability in the special case 
  19of Buffie (1995): instantaneous tariff reduction where full employment is 
maintained throughout the liberalization episode. Working toward this end, 
solution (21) becomes 
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 (22) 
when v is set to unity and full employment is assumed. To illustrate the dual 
equilibria that can arise, Figure 1 provides the path of foreign exchange reserve 
following trade liberalization under perfect and imperfect credibility for a given 
set of parameter values. 
As noted in Buffie (1995), conditions exist under instantaneous 
liberalization and full employment where a self-fulfilling success (hereafter SFS) 
is the only equilibrium. For instance, the sustainability of the trade liberalization 
is ensured if the government holds a sizable reserve cushion, Ψ - f1, or if the 
jump in savings at t1, J1, is negative. To understand why a sizable reserve cushion 
is a sufficient condition for sustained liberalization, notice that the right hand side 
of (22) is finite. Therefore, a government can ensure that sustained liberalization 
is a unique equilibrium path if it holds a reserve cushion greater than the finite 
losses in reserves associated with imperfectly credible liberalization. 
Moreover, a negative value for J1 ensures sustained liberalization is a 
unique equilibrium, regardless of the sign of f1, the long-run elasticity of reserves. 
Certainly, if J1 is negative and f1 is positive, then (22) will never hold as an 
equality, given a non-negative reserve cushion. In the case of f1 < 0, consider that 
(22) can be rearranged as  
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Thus, as this equation demonstrates, J1 < 0 also ensures sustainability when f1 is 
negative. For J1 to be negative, though, 
  1. b τ <  (23) 
Condition (23) implies that trade liberalization is more likely to be sustained 
when consumers are inclined to smooth consumption and the liberalization 
produces significant temporary real income gains since savings rises on the 
transition path. 
 
7.  Instantaneous liberalization with transitory unemployment 
Unfortunately, condition (23), the sufficiency condition for sustained 
liberalization in the case of instantaneous liberalization and full employment, 
does not ensure sustainability when transitory unemployment occurs. To 
demonstrate, notice that when the tariff h is reduced instantaneously to its target 
level  h* and transitory unemployment results from the trade liberalization, 
solution (21) becomes 
  ()
21 1
















− ⎧⎫ ⎡ − ⎡⎤ Ψ− = − + − − + ⎨⎬
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)
 (24) 
Thus, solution (24) differs from solution (22) in two important ways. First, 
solution (24) has an additional positive term not found in solution (22), namely 
 where, as before, b ( 12 , bb γ − 1 and b2 are the real income gain under full 
employment and transitory unemployment, respectively. Second, the condition 
  21that ensures a negative jump in savings at t1 is stricter under transitory 
unemployment:  2, b τ <  instead of  1. b τ <  To understand the intuition behind 
these differences, consider that transitory unemployment produces a temporary 
adverse income shock. As a result, savings falls as people smooth consumption, 
which contributes to the deterioration of the payments balance. 
Figure 2 illustrates the case where imperfectly credible liberalization can 
lead to a SFF equilibrium under transitory unemployment, but not under full 
employment. For a broader understanding of how transitory unemployment 
impacts the sustainability of the liberalization, though, Tables 1 and 2 provide 
cases where SFS is a unique equilibrium, as indicated by a “U”, when full 
employment is maintained and when transitory unemployment occurs, 
respectively. When SFF is also an equilibrium, the tables provide the time of 
policy reversal. Like the above qualitative analysis, the tables demonstrate that 
transitory unemployment increases the likelihood of a reversal in the trade 
liberalization. More specifically, the tables suggest that the size of the parameter 
space in which sustained liberalization is a unique equilibrium can fall by almost 
one third if transitory unemployment occurs. Table 2 also shows that a low value 
for τ and a moderate foreign exchange reserve cushion do not ensure sustained 
liberalization under transitory unemployment, even though these conditions are 
sufficient to ensure sustained liberalization in the full employment case. 
Consequently, the likelihood of policy reversal is greater than previously shown 
in the literature. 
 
  228.  Gradual liberalization with full employment 
Equation (21) establishes not only that transitory unemployment increases 
the likelihood that instantaneous tariff reduction will be reversed when the trade 
liberalization lacks credibility, but also that gradual tariff reduction can extend 
the life of the liberalization episode. First, for any given time t < ∞ after the 
initiation of the liberalization, a smaller value for k reduces the impact of the 
jump in savings, J, on the balance of payments. Thus, gradualism reduces the 
right hand side of solution (21), the equation that determines whether or not a 
SFF occurs, when condition (23) does not hold. Because the tariff rate falls 
gradually, the tariff rate is higher than it would be under instantaneous 
liberalization until the liberalization is complete. The relatively higher tariff 
prompts consumers to import less than they would have under instantaneous 
liberalization. This lower spending could potentially offset the impact on the 
balance of payments of consumers buying imports in anticipation of a reversal of 
the trade liberalization. 
Second, with gradualism, another term appears on the right hand side of 
equation (21), namely 
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This term is more informative when rearranged as 
  ( ) ()
1 , ii bk b ρδ τ
− ⎡⎤ − +−Π ⎣⎦  (25) 
where 
  23  ()
21 1 1 2 1 1
1 () 11 2
12
1.
tk t t k t k
gk k e e e e
λλ λ λ
γρ δ μ ρ
λλ
− −− − −− ⎧ ⎫ −− ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ Π≡ − + − + − ⎨ ⎬ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ − ⎩⎭
 
Π is negative for a wide range of plausible parameter values.
10 Thus, the impact 
of gradualism on the sustainability of the reform in the full employment case 
depends on the sign of  () ( )
1
1 . bk b ρδ τ
− −+ − 1  More specifically, if 
  ( )
1
1, kk ρδ τ ρ
− +>+ b  (26) 
then for any given finite time following the initiation of the trade liberalization, a 
slower rate of tariff reduction reduces the right hand side of (21). In other words, 
when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is large relative to the real 
income gain, gradualism reduces the right hand side of equation (21) for any 
given finite time not only because the impact of the jump in savings, J, is 
reduced, but also because condition (26) is met. 
From this qualitative analysis, one might conclude at first glance that 
gradualism increases the likelihood of sustained liberalization since it reduces the 
right hand side of equation (21) for any given finite time. However, consider that 
time is held constant for the above analysis. Even though at a given point in time, 
the right hand side of equation (21) is smaller under gradual liberalization than 
under instantaneous liberalization, a time will come under gradual liberalization 
where the representative agent faces virtually the same tariff levels and, thus, the 
same incentives to binge on import goods as under instantaneous liberalization. 
Consequently, gradualism may serve only to extend the duration of the 
liberalization episode, but not increase the likelihood of sustained liberalization, 
as the terms associated with gradualism in equation (21) seem to suggest. In 
  24particular, the rate of tariff reduction, k, does not stand independently of the 
endogenously-determined expected time of policy reversal, t1 in equation (21), 
indicating that gradualism affects the realized value of t1, but does not impact the 
sustainability of the liberalization. However, a clear analytical solution regarding 
the impact of gradualism on the likelihood of sustained liberalization cannot be 
derived due to the fact that the rate of tariff reduction, k, appears in both 
multiplicative and exponential forms in equation (21). 
Figure 3 demonstrates how gradualism can increase the duration of the 
liberalization episode, but not increase the likelihood of sustained liberalization. 
To further illustrate, numerical solutions for equation (21) are computed for a 
range of plausible parameter values. In particular, Tables 4 and 5 provide cases 
where sustained trade liberalization is a unique equilibrium, denoted by a “U”, 
for k = .46 and k = 2.3, respectively. When SFF is an equilibrium, the tables also 
provide the time of policy reversal. A comparison of these tables to Table 1 
shows that there are no cases where gradual liberalization is sustained but 
instantaneous liberalization is not. These tables are part of a larger body of 
sensitivity analysis for the model that indicate that gradualism does not affect the 
sustainability of trade liberalization, contrary to the claims of Dornbusch (1992) 
and Takacs (1990) and the results in Froot (1988).  
Even though the tables do not show that gradualism increases the 
likelihood of sustained liberalization, they do show that the duration of the 
liberalization episode can be significantly longer under gradual liberalization than 
under instantaneous liberalization. For k = .46, the liberalization episode can last 
  25more than six years longer under gradual liberalization than under instantaneous 
liberalization. Even under the relatively fast liberalization of k = 2.3, the life of 
the liberalization episode can be more than a year longer than under instantaneous 
liberalization. 
 
9.  Gradual liberalization with transitory unemployment 
In section 8, gradualism was shown to extend the life of imperfectly 
credible liberalization episodes when full employment is maintained and the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, τ, is large relative to the real income gain 
from liberalization, b1. Gradualism can also be shown to extend the life of 
imperfectly credible trade liberalization that produces transitory unemployment 
when  τ is large relative to b2, the real income gain under transitory 
unemployment. The difference between these two cases, though, is that b1 > b2. 
Therefore, gradual tariff reduction is more effective in extending the life of the 
liberalization episode when transitory unemployment is a byproduct of the 
liberalization. This result holds true because until the liberalization is complete, 
gradualism's relatively higher tariff is associated with a smaller contraction in 
production than would occur if the tariff rate was reduced instantaneously to the 
target level. A comparison of Table 2 to Table 6 demonstrates this point. For k = 
.46, the life of the liberalization episode can be more than five years longer under 
gradual trade liberalization than under instantaneous trade liberalization. As in 
the full employment case though, the tables show that gradualism extends the life 
of the liberalization episode, but does not increase the likelihood of sustained 
  26liberalization. Thus, despite claims to the contrary, the preceding analysis 
suggests that policymakers cannot adjust the speed of liberalization to ensure the 
sustainability of the liberalization policy. If a self-fulfilling reversal of the trade 
liberalization would occur under instantaneous tariff reduction, then gradualism 
only postpones the inevitable in an economy with a closed capital account. The 
results might differ, however, if labor’s decision to move to the export sector 
depends on the length of time between the initiation of the policy and its expected 
reversal. In such a scenario, sustainability may very well depend on the speed of 
the liberalization. 
 
10.  Impact of transitory unemployment and gradualism with an open 
capital account 
In the above closed capital account case, consumers reduce money 
balances in order to binge on imports if they believe the trade liberalization will 
be temporary, which, in turn, can produce a significant cumulative payments 
deficit. In an economy with an open capital account though, reduction in money 
balances is not the only way for consumers to dissave. For example, the 
consumer could finance their import binge by selling foreign bonds. Thus, 
imperfectly credible trade liberalization may produce very different dynamics 
under an open capital account. Accordingly, this section examines the impact of 
transitory unemployment and the rate of tariff reduction on imperfectly credible 
trade liberalization in an economy with an open capital account. 
  27In analyzing the open capital account case, the characteristics of 
production and the labor market remain the same as in the closed capital account 
case. Also, as in the previous case, the representative agent maximizes utility of 
consumption and non-pecuniary services yielded by real money balances, but the 
maximization is subject to different constraints: 
  , A MB = +  (27) 
  () ( ) ( ) ,, mm m m , E S R PL hD PE Q rBY + = + −++ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  (28) 
 , AS =   (29) 
where A represents financial assets, B represents foreign bonds, Y represents the 
central bank’s foreign exchange reserves, and S now represents the accumulation 
of financial assets over time. As the budget constraint shows, interest on 
government reserves is rebated to the public in lump sum.  
The budget constraint can be rewritten by substituting for B and S from 
the wealth constraint and equation (29). Accordingly, the Hamiltonian reads  
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where π is the multiplier associated with wealth accumulation. 
By maximizing the Hamiltonian with respect to expenditures, nominal 
money balances, and savings, the following first order conditions can be derived: 
  ( ) , Em VP E π = ,  (30) 
  ( ) '/ mm rM P P ,
γ γ πφ =  (31) 
  ( ). r ππ ρ = −   (32) 
  28To ensure convergence to a stationary equilibrium, the rate of time preference is 
assumed to equal the world market interest rate. Thus, equations (30) and (32) 
imply 
   (33)  0 EP m EE VP VE =+  . 
From solution (33), the budget constraint, and the policy rule, the 
economy’s dynamics are determined. Working toward this end, totally 
differentiate the budget constraint and substitute for Lm from equations (1) and  
(2). On the transition path, this yields 
  ( ) ( )
1 1 i , E Db h g r S S
− =−+ −     (34) 
under the simplifying assumption that the money supply equals the government’s 
foreign exchange reserves. By deriving the differential equation for savings from 
(33) and (34), the economy’s dynamics are 
  ( )
.
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If the tariff reduction is perceived as temporary by the private sector, S 
and h will evolve over the period (0, t1) according to 
  () ( )
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where c1 and c2 are constants determined from the initial conditions and t1 is the 
time of the policy reversal. Solutions for c1 and c2 are found using the same 
method employed in the appendix for the closed capital account case. Given the 
solutions for these constants, equation (36) becomes 
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In order to derive the foreign exchange reserve loss under temporary 
liberalization, note that a perfect foresight equilibrium requires the multiplier π be 
constant after it jumps at t0. Exploiting this information, first order conditions 
(30) and (31) imply 
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From equation (39), the cumulative payments surplus can be determined. 
Working toward this end, the jump in expenditures at t0 is derived by substituting 
for S(0) from equation (38) at t0 into the total derivative of the budget constraint 
at t0. Given that foreign bonds and the central bank's foreign exchange reserves 
are predetermined variables at t0, this yields 
  () ( ) ( ) 0 ˆ 01 ii , m E Eb v b γτ −= − +− ϒ P ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦  
where 
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1 1 1.
rk t rt ev r e k r
−+ − ϒ≡ − − + +k  
Consequently, the cumulative payments surplus is determined by 
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As in the closed capital account case, if the foreign exchange reserve loss 
exceeds   then the government will immediately restore the tariff to its pre-
liberalization level. Thus, at t
, Ψ
1, the time when the reform is reversed,   equals  Ψ
  30the reserve loss in equation (40). Accordingly, self-fulfilling failure is an 
equilibrium if 
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holds as an equality for some positive value of t1 or if the right hand side of 
equation (41) is larger than the left hand side at t = 0, where f1 denotes the impact 
of a credible trade liberalization on the balance of payments as derived in section 
3. 
If the tariff rate is reduced to its target instantaneously and full 
employment is maintained, equation (41) becomes 
  ( )
1
11 .
rt f be γτ
− Ψ− = −  (42) 
Thus in this special case of tariff liberalization originally derived in Buffie 
(1995), b1 < τ ensures that SFS is a unique equilibrium. Notably, this condition 
for sustained liberalization is exactly opposite of condition (23), the condition for 
sustained liberalization in the closed capital account. As discussed in Buffie 
(1995), this difference arises because under an open capital account, the interest 
rate is fixed. Thus, by equation (31), lower saving is associated with higher 
money balances, which contrasts to the closed capital account case where the 
only way to dissave is to reduce money balances. 
Like the closed capital account case, though, transitory unemployment 
increases the likelihood of a SFF. To illustrate, again assume that the tariff rate is 
instantaneously reduced to its target level. Thus, if transitory unemployment 
arises, equation (41) becomes 
  31  ( )
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which differs from equation (42) in that equation (43) has the additional positive 
term  () ( )
1
12 1
rt bb e γ
− −−.  Accordingly, the sufficiency condition for sustained 
liberalization in the case of instantaneous liberalization and full employment, b1 < 
τ, does not ensure sustained liberalization when transitory unemployment occurs. 
In effect, transitory unemployment produces a temporary adverse income shock, 
which causes consumers to reduce their spending and, thus, their money 
balances. 
Equation (41) also demonstrates that the rate of tariff reduction affects the 
duration of the liberalization episode. To illustrate, notice that when full 
employment is maintained throughout the liberalization episode, equation (41), 
the general condition for sustained liberalization, differs from equation (42), the 
special case of instantaneous liberalization, in that equation (41) has an additional 
term, namely  
  ()
() () () ()
1 1
1 1
rk t kt rb e r k e γτ τ
−+ − ⎡⎤ −− + + − ⎣⎦ 1 .  (44) 
Likewise, if transitory unemployment is a byproduct of the liberalization, 
equation (41) differs from equation (43) in that equation (41) has the additional 
term 
  ()
() () () ()
1 1
2 1
rk t kt rb e r k e γτ τ
−+ − ⎡⎤ −− + + − ⎣⎦ 1 .  (45) 
As in the closed capital account case, though, the terms (44) and (45) 
demonstrate that the case for gradualism is strongest when the real income gain, 
bi, is small. Since b1 > b2, gradualism is, therefore, more likely to extend the 
  32duration of the liberalization episode when transitory unemployment occurs. The 
intuition behind this result is the same as it was in the closed capital account case: 
Under gradualism, the tariff rate is higher than it would be under instantaneous 
liberalization until the liberalization is complete. Thus, gradualism's relatively 
higher tariff is associated with a smaller contraction in production than would 
occur if the tariff rate was reduced instantaneously to the target level. 
According to the terms (44) and (45), the effectiveness of gradualism in 
extending the duration of the liberalization episode also depends on the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, τ. However, the impact of the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution on gradualism's effectiveness is not readily 
apparent because two opposing effects are at work. With regards to the first one, 
consider that for any given time following the initiation of imperfectly credible 
liberalization, the temporary real income gains are more fully realized under 
instantaneous tariff reduction than under gradual tariff reduction. Thus, this effect 
suggests that consumers will not binge on imports as much under gradualism as 
under instantaneous liberalization when τ is small. Nonetheless, a second, 
opposing effect suggests that gradualism is most effective in extending the 
liberalization when τ is large. To illustrate, consider that under gradualism, real 
income gains will rise until the liberalization is reversed. The expected future 
income gains will prompt consumers to increase import purchases, particularly if 
τ is small. Of these two opposing effects, the first one will dominate for low 
values of t ≤ t1, while the second one will dominate for high values of t1. 
  33Gradualism not only can affect the duration of the liberalization episode 
under an open capital account, but also it can affect the size of the cumulative 
payments deficit, and, thus, the likelihood of sustained liberalization in certain 
circumstances. More specifically, notice that in the terms (44) and (45), 
() () i rb r k γτ −+  stands independently of the endogenously-determined 
expected time of policy reversal, t1, in equation (41), which indicates that 
gradualism can affect not only the time of reversal, but also the cumulative loss in 
foreign exchange reserves. In fact, conditions under which gradualism increases 
the likelihood of sustained liberalization can be found from the terms (44) and 
(45). In particular, the terms (44) and (45) are negative when bi < τ < 1 for i = 1, 
2, respectively. Unfortunately though, this sufficiency condition for gradualism to 
increase the likelihood of sustained liberalization is actually more restrictive than 
b1 < τ, the sufficiency condition for sustained liberalization when the tariff rate is 
reduced instantaneously and full employment is maintained. As noted above 
though, the condition b1 < τ is not sufficient for sustained liberalization when 
transitory unemployment occurs. Consequently, gradualism can increase the 
likelihood of sustained liberalization when transitory unemployment occurs if b2 
< τ < 1, as illustrated in Figure 4. Thus, in contrast to the closed capital account 
case, conditions exist in an economy with an open capital account in which 
gradualism sustains imperfectly credible liberalization. 
Although gradualism can increase the likelihood of sustained 
liberalization for an economy with an open capital account, claims that 
gradualism will necessarily increase the likelihood of sustained liberalization 
  34cannot be supported since the impact of gradualism depends on the values of bi 
and τ. In fact, plausible parameter values exist for which gradualism reduces the 
likelihood of sustained liberalization under an open capital account. To illustrate, 
notice that if τ > b1 > 1 and full employment is maintained, solution (41) shows 
that trade liberalization would be sustained if the tariff rate was reduced to its 
target level instantaneously, but would be reversed at t1 = 0 if it was reduced 
gradually and the liberalization lacked credibility.
11 To understand why the 
reversal would only occurs under gradual liberalization, consider that higher real 
income gains are realized initially under instantaneous liberalization than under 
gradual liberalization. Thus, if the agent is not interested in smoothing 
consumption, her initial demand for money balances is higher under 
instantaneous liberalization as her consumption is higher. Consequently, 
policymakers should reduce the tariff rate gradually only if they anticipate that 
labor will not relocate to the export sector because of the policy’s lack of 
credibility and the condition b2 < τ < 1 is met.  
 
11.  Conclusions 
The preceding analysis provides two important new insights about 
imperfectly credible trade liberalization. First, the sustainability of the 
liberalization depends not only on the expectations of consumers, but also on the 
expectations of labor, who may choose not to seek employment in the export 
sector when the trade liberalization lacks credibility. In fact, transitory 
unemployment can cause an otherwise sustainable liberalization to be reversed. 
  35Second, the rate of tariff reduction cannot necessarily be adjusted to improve the 
likelihood of sustained trade liberalization. For an economy with a closed capital 
account, gradual tariff reduction serves only to extend the liberalization episode. 
For an economy with an open capital account, gradualism can increase the 
likelihood of sustained liberalization, but only in certain circumstances. Thus, the 
grim reality is that the success of trade liberalization rests squarely on the 
expectations of consumers and labor. 
 Given these results, it is even more imperative that reformist 
governments take measures to ensure credibility so that a SFS is the unique 
equilibrium outcome of trade liberalization. For instance, policymakers could 
signal their commitment to trade liberalization by joining a free trade area or 
regime, as Brazil, Columbia, and Mexico did when they became members of the 
World Trade Organization. The preceding analysis does not even rule out a role 
for the speed of liberalization in ensuring credibility. For psychological reasons, 
the speed of liberalization may matter for credibility. On one hand, an 
instantaneous liberalization may signal stronger commitment that gradual 
liberalization. On the other hand, if expectations of policy reversal decline over 
time, gradualism may be the answer since the preceding analysis shows that 
gradualism can extend the liberalization episode under a closed capital account. 
Whatever the means to ensure credibility though, this paper demonstrates the 
need for policymakers to consider them, particularly if labor decisions are 
influenced by the policy’s credibility. 
 
  36Appendix 
In order to find the loss in foreign exchange reserves associated with 
imperfectly credible trade liberalization under a closed capital account, solutions 
for the constants q1,  q2,  q3, and y must be found. Working toward this end, 
equation (17) at t = 0 yields 
  ( )( ) 30 *1 , qh h v =− − (A.1) 
where 
  ( ) ( ) 00 0* vh h h h ≡− − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ .  
The term v equals unity when the tariff rate is reduced instantaneously, but is 
equated to zero when the tariff rate is reduced gradually. 
  Given the solution for q3, the constants q2, q3, and y can be derived by 
utilizing equation (14) and its equivalent under transitory unemployment, 
  ( ) 2 ˆˆ /1 m 2 . f MP b γ ≡= −  (A.2) 
More specifically, the solution for q2 is found by substituting equations (14), 
(A.1), and (A.2) into equation (16) at t = 0. Accordingly, 
  ( )( ) 21 0 ˆ 11 , 1 , im qqf M hv P i =− − −Ω + − = ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ 2 .  
Substituting this equation into (16) gives the path of nominal money balances 
during the liberalization phase, 
() ( ) ( ) () () ( )
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λ λλ λ λ ⎡⎤ − = −+ −+ Ω +− − ⎣⎦ (A.3) 
Since current trade policy does not affect current values of nominal 
money balances, M is predetermined. Thus, at time t1, equation (A.3) must have 
  37the same value for M as equation (19). Accordingly, (19) and (A.3) can be 
equated to produce  
  () ( ) () () ( )
31 21 21 11 21 21
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To compute the second equation needed to solve for q1 and y, recall that 
foreseen jumps in VE, the marginal utility of expenditures, are inconsistent with 
optimizing behavior because a smoother consumption path would increase the 
utility of the representative agent. Thus, in a perfect foresight equilibrium, 
savings must jump at t1, the time when the trade liberalization is reversed, in 
order to keep VE constant. Exploiting this information and the formula derived 
from Roy’s identity,  1/ PE EE VV D , τ =+  (7), (10), and (17) imply that the jump in 
S at t1 is 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) 11ˆ , im St St J P t
+− −=1  (A.5) 
where 
  ( )( ) 1. ix JD h c b τ ≡+ − i
. λ
 
Equations (15) and (18) also provide a solution for the jump in savings at 
time t1. Equating that solution to the one in (A.5) generates 
   (A.6)  ()
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Together, equations (A.4) and (A.6) determine the solutions for the constants q1 
and y. By substituting the expression for q1 into (A.3), the solution for the path of 
money balances (20) is generated. 
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Figure 1: The expectation of policy reversal can cause an 
otherwise sustainable liberalization to be reversed. (In generating 
this particular graph, instantaneous tariff reduction and full 
employment were assumed. Also, ε and τ were set at 0.2 and 0.5, 
respectively.) 
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Figure 2: Transitory unemployment decreases the likelihood of 
sustained liberalization. (In generating this particular graph, 
instantaneous tariff reduction was assumed. Also, ε and τ were set 
at 0.2 and 0.5, respectively.) 
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Figure 3: For an economy with a closed capital account, 
gradualism extends the life of the liberalization episode, but does 
not increase the likelihood of sustained liberalization. (In 
generating this particular graph, full employment was assumed. 
Also, ε, τ, and k were set at 0.2, 0.5, and 0.46, respectively.) 
  45 












Figure 4: For an economy with an open capital account, 
gradualism can increase the likelihood of sustained liberalization 
in certain circumstances when transitory unemployment arises. (In 
generating this particular graph, ε, τ, k, and Ψ were set at values of 
0.2, 2, 0.46, and f1 + 0.05, respectively.) 
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Table 1: Full Employment Case 
         τ          
ε  0.1 0.25 0.5  1  2   
   U  2.68 0.33 0.12 0.05    f1 (.21) 
U  U  1.29 0.32 0.13    0.5 
0.2
U  U  U  0.87 0.28    1 
   U  U  U  U  0.75    2 
   U  U  U  0.12 0.02    f1 (.06) 
U  U  U  U  0.20    0.5 
2
U  U  U  U  0.48    1 
   U  U  U  U  2.26    2 
    
        
Table 2: Transitory Unemployment Case 
         τ          
ε  0.1 0.25 0.5  1  2   
   0.38  0.24 0.14 0.08 0.04    f1 (.21) 
1.59  0.75 0.40 0.21 0.11    0.5 
0.2
U  U  1.24 0.49 0.23    1 
   U  U  U  2.16 0.56    2 
   U  U  0.34 0.04 0.02    f1 (.06) 
U  U  U  0.51 0.15    0.5 
2
U  U  U  2.40 0.34    1 
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Table 3: Parameter Values for Sign Test 
 Minimum Maximum  
Parameter Value  Value Interval
ρ  0.01 0.11 0.025
δ  0.5 2 0.25
μ  0.05 0.2 0.025
cx 0.6 0.9 0.05
H  0.15 1.05 0.15
K  0.2 2.7 0.25
t1 0.05 12 0.05
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Table 4: Gradual Liberalization with k = .46 
Full Employment Case 
         τ          
ε  0.1 0.25 0.5  1  2  
   U  6.22 1.86 0.96 0.58    f1 (.21) 
U  U  4.85 1.91 1.03    0.5 
0.2
U  U  U  4.00 1.80    1 
   U  U  U  U  3.69    2 
   U  U  U  0.96 0.34    f1 (.06) 
U  U  U  U  1.42    0.5 
2
U  U  U  U  2.68    1 
   U  U  U  U  8.75    2 
        
        
        
Table 5: Gradual Liberalization with k = 2.3 
Full Employment Case 
         τ          
ε  0.1 0.25 0.5  1  2  
   U  3.28 0.77 0.40 0.24    f1 (.21) 
U  U  2.12 0.77 0.43    0.5 
0.2
U  U  U  1.62 0.71    1 
   U  U  U  U  1.45    2 
   U  U  U  0.40 0.14    f1 (.06) 
U  U  U  U  0.57    0.5 
2
U  U  U  U  1.04    1 
   U  U  U  U  4.02    2 
        
Ψ
Ψ
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Table 6: Gradual Liberalization with k = .46 
Transitory Unemployment Case 
         τ          
ε  0.1 0.25 0.5  1  2   
   1.97  1.47 1.08 0.75 0.52    f1 (.21) 
5.18  3.28 2.19 1.42 0.91    0.5 
0.2
U  U  4.92 2.63 1.54    1 
   U  U  U  7.72 2.96    2 
   U  U  1.71 0.52 0.29    f1 (.06) 
U  U  U  2.68 1.16    0.5 
2
U  U  U  8.32 2.06    1 
   U  U  U  U  4.56    2 
Ψ
 
  50Endnotes 
 
1 See studies in Krueger (1978), Papageorgiou et al. (1991), and, as noted in 
Collier and Gunning (2000), Foroutan and Nash (1994). 
2 See, for example, Rodrik (1990) and Reinikki (2000).  
3 In section 5, these parameter values are shown to be realistic for developing 
economies. 
4 Under homothetic preferences, cx = 1 - γ. 
5 As noted in Calvo (1987) and (1988), temporary liberalization is equivalent to 
imperfectly credible liberalization. 
6 Economic reforms can be cancelled for a multitude of reasons. For example, in 
Mehlum (2001a) and (2001b), self-fulfilling failures can arise if unemployment 
persists too long or wages fall too far. Here, I focus on the loss in foreign 
exchange reserves as the trigger for the policy reversal since “abortions of [trade] 
liberalizations are almost universally preceded by a balance of payments 
deterioration” (Papageorgiou et al., 1991: 274). 
7 For a summary of the studies that have estimated the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution for developing countries, see Agénor and Montiel (1996: 353).  
8 See, for example, studies in Behrman (1982) and Mansur and Whalley (1984). 
9 The value for the cost share of labor in the import-competing sector is 
consistent with data for 1991 from the World Development Report, 1994.  More 
specifically, the report shows that the simple average share of earnings by 
employees in manufacturing's value added was 28.2% for low-income countries 
and 31.3% for middle-income countries. The value for the cost share of labor in 
the export sector is consistent with the finding in the country studies by Krueger 
et al. (1981b) that exports require on average 50% more labor per unit of value 
added than import-competing goods. For a summary of these results, see Krueger 
(1981a: table 2). 
10 Table 3 lists the range of parameter values used to verify the sign of Π. 
11  A policy reversal can not even be ruled out if the government is able to borrow 
foreign exchange reserves to cover the initial deficit because the liberalization 
does not generate sufficient reserves across steady states for the government to be 
able to repay the loan. 
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